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Despite widespread concern about how social media can be exploited by political
campaigns, the UK is embarking on a general election campaign without any regulation
in place about digital advertisements. Bethany Shiner explains what the problem is,
the difficulties with regulation and self-regulation, and how voters should beware of the
political messages they see online.
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Now that there is going to another general election, on 12 December, the question of how
digital political advertisements should be regulated becomes pressing once again. Since
the 2016 UK-EU referendum and the 2017 general election, how political parties and
campaign groups communicate with the electorate online has received a lot of scrutiny
but little clarity. Even Facebook, pre-empting the inevitable use of its platform for
campaigning, has requested guidance from the UK government on what constitutes a
political advertisement.
What’s the issue: micro-targeting voters
Methods to shape, or distort, political communication online include the use of bots and
trolls to spread disinformation. Micro-targeting, the practice of sending selected
individuals online tailored and highly optimised content using opaque methods of
personal data profiling, has been singled out as being particularly damaging to democratic
discourse. This practice is not unlawful in itself but it is problematic because the extent to
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which political campaigners target individuals leads to a divergence in the overall message
of the political party and can be used to target small pockets of ‘undecided’ voters in
marginal constituencies to swing election outcomes. These individuals are often targeted
on the basis of personal data misuse. The effect of this can be corrosive as it veers towards
a form of communication which is keen to say what campaigners think the individual
wants to hear, is harder to hold to account, enables parties to pitch inconsistent campaign
promises or policy positions to different sets of voters and opens up the possibility of
foreign influence. The real effect of these new forms of communication are unknown,
although my sense is that they do not change how someone votes but can influence
whether someone votes. Further research on this must be completed to inform legislative
agendas.
Facebook and Twitter’s differing approaches to self-regulation
Why Facebook needs to know how the government defines a political advertisement is
unclear, since Facebook has reaffirmed its policy not to ban political advertisements or
monitor their content. Whatever the reason, this question reminds us how difficult
legislators have found addressing the problem of online political communication – even
though it has been agreed that the practices witnessed during the Brexit campaign and
recent elections threaten ‘the very fabric of our democracy’ by deceitfully trying to
influence peoples’ vote.
One may be forgiven for thinking that the problem has been dealt with following Twitter’s
announcement that it will ban all paid-for political advertisements. Yet, this move appears
to be for PR purposes as the site hosts very few paid-for political advertisements. Instead,
Twitter’s real issue is bot accounts that spread disinformation and political content,
creating artificial streams of (fake) news which the ban does not address.
Twitter’s position contrasts with Facebook’s, which continues to allow paid-for political
content, albeit on the condition that certain requirements are met, including account-
holder verification of identity and place of residence. This is meant to eliminate the risk of
foreign actors purchasing advertisements to influence another nation’s elections, but
could be subverted by simply having someone within the target country willing to collude.
This verification process has already been undermined, with political advertisements
appearing on Facebook without the  required information about who is responsible for
them, suggesting the verification process is inadequate.
Facebook has also tried to pacify legislators and users following the Cambridge Analytica
scandal by creating an Ad Library that stores all paid-for advertisements on social issues,
elections and politics, along with details of who paid for them and who they were targeted
towards. The Ad Library does increase transparency but is no antidote to the overall effect
of tailored advertisements or the deceptive use of personal data involved in the use of
micro-targeted advertisements. Facebook has recently announced that it is further
tackling political dark ads by taking down content that does not comply with the new
verification requirements through a mix of human and algorithmic review. Its Vice-
President also suggested that a special UK operations centre may be set up to manage pre-
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election content, which means it will ensure all advertisements comply to the verification
rules. However, the content of adverts will still go unmonitored, which is the right
decision – why would we want Facebook, rather than an independent authority, to be the
guardian of the publication of political communication, even when it contains misleading
or false information?
Facebook’s own employees have warned about its position on political advertisements,
suggesting in a letter to CEO Mark Zuckerberg numerous solutions to counter the
degenerate effect of inflammatory, divisive and false material spread on Facebook. Their
suggestions included limiting micro-targeted advertisements, fact-checking content and
observing pre-election silence periods. There are other technological innovations that
could be deployed, such as building mechanisms that create a moment for the user to
pause before sharing something, so that content does not go viral on impulse alone, or
Facebook could create a specific section on users’ walls for paid-for political material so
that it is not blended into a stream of uncritically watched cat videos. The element of
passive consumption could be removed or reduced for political content so users can
converse about material in a separate space, which might help reduce the echo chamber
effect.
Regulatory reform is needed
Even if these ideas were to be implemented by Facebook, self-regulation is not a viable
long-term solution because the methods of digital political communication are too
important for self-serving and compromising corporate policies. It is imprudent to forget
that service providers like Facebook will never put election integrity before its own profits,
and these two objectives are bound to be in conflict despite what Facebook says.
Because the question of how to regulate digital political content is so difficult, nothing has
been agreed to date other than to require imprints on digital content just as they are
required on print material (though even this has not been enacted for the upcoming
election). This is far from sufficient. A ban on micro-targeted political advertisements may
be justified – it would certainly be a simpler way to regulate. Direct digital
communication with the electorate from local councillors or MPs can continue by email
but the splatter-gun approach that micro-targeting encourages would be avoided. Other
options might be feasible at a national level and internationally. Indeed, a UN high-level
inquiry recently reported on digital cooperation which was mindful of political cyber-
attacks.
What can voters do?
Despite the warnings, political advertisements will be used in this election in much the
same way as the last, since not a single law has been passed in response to the Cambridge
Analytica and Facebook scandal. What can voters do in these circumstances? Be wise to
the use of micro-targeting, scrutinise the content of online material or investigate why you
are seeing particular advertisements (click the ‘why am I seeing this ad?’ button on
Facebook). Also, be alert to the fact that when clicking on political advertisements that
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take you to another webpage that requests your email address and other personal details,
you may be allowing your personal data and online behaviour to be consumed and
analysed. Finally, as the Data Protection Act 2018 is in force you can exercise your rights
under the Act including the right to object to direct marketing or to lodge a complaint
with the Information Commissioner’s Office. This is as good as it gets until additional
regulations are introduced to provide some clarity and consistency.
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